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HERCULES' REPLY TO WAGNER'S BRIEF 
Pursuant to Rule 50, Utah R. App. Proc, Hercules 
hereby replies to Wagner's Brief in Opposition to Petition for 
Certiorari, 
1. Wagner erroneously claims the trial court dis-
missed its cause of action for Hercules' failure to obtain a pay-
ment bond on the basis of the court's legal conclusion that the 
mobile office units did not constitute an improvement on the 
land. (Wagner's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari 
("Brief1) at 1). In reality, the trial court's conclusion 
regarding the legal status of the mobile office units was based 
upon its factual findings. Furthermore, the trial court's judg-
ment was also based upon the conclusion that because the Navy 
owned the land and Modulaire owned the trailers, Hercules is not 
a person subject to the provisions of the Payment Bond Statute. 
(R. 624, UK 2-3; 625, 1 5; 628, 1 2). 
2. Wagner claims that the trial court's Findings 
excluded "undisputed facts which should have been and were in 
1
 The trial court found the following facts: the office units 
(1) were mobile (R. 624, H 3); (2) were in no way fixed to the 
ground (R. 626, 11 15); (3) were placed on the Navy's land tempo-
rarily and not integrated into, affixed to, annexed to, or 
adapted to the Navy's land (R. 627-28, 1 22); and (4) were not 
placed on the Navy's land permanently and intentionally by 
Hercules (R. 628, 1 23). 
Wagner claims that Hercules has mischaracterized the nature 
of the trailers by referring to them as "mobile." (Wagner's 
Brief at 8 n.4). The trial court, however, which viewed the evi-
dence, including numerous photographs of the office units, refers 
in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the mobility of 
the units no less than fifteen times in five pages. (R. 
624-628). 
-1-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fact part of the factual analysis upon which the trial court 
based its legal conclusions." (Brief at 1). However, Wagner 
raised this issue with the trial court. The court, whose prov-
ince it is to ascertain the facts, conscientiously rejected Wag-
ner's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, because 
they did not comport with the evidence. 
3. Wagner claims that Hercules' Statement of the Case 
contains inaccuracies and mischaracterizations, and therefore, 
sets forth its own statement of facts. (Brief at 2). Paradoxi-
cally, Wagner's first statement of "fact," i.e., that this action 
arises out of Wagner supplying materials for the construction of 
office space, is simply a legal conclusion. Whether placing the 
leased mobile office units on the Navy's property constitutes 
"construction" requires a legal conclusion because the statute 
applies to contracts "exceeding $2,000 in amount for the 
construction. . . of any building, structure or improvement upon 
land." Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986)(emphasis added). There-
fore, Wagner errs in stating that, as a matter of fact, office 
space was constructed. 
4. Wagner claims that the agreement between Space 
Building Systems and Modulaire refers to Hercules as the "owner." 
(Brief at 3, 1 5). The terms used in the subcontract between 
Space Building Systems and Modulaire to refer to Hercules, how-
ever, are not determinative of Hercules' legal status in this 
case. Hercules was not a party to that contract. Furthermore, 
the Navy, not Hercules, owned the land on which the mobile office 
units were placed, and Modulaire, not Hercules, owned the 
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trailers. Hercules only leased the units. The serious legal 
issues in this case and the facts which relate to them certainly 
should not be determined by the language of a contract which 
Hercules did not draft and to which it was not a party. 
5. In attempting to overcome the "inadequacies" of 
Hercules' Statement of the Case, Wagner sites the affidavit of 
its own attorney for a description of the mobile office units. 
(Brief at 4, H 10). The conclusory statements of the attorney 
are mere argument and contradict the findings of fact of the 
2 
trial court. The trial court heard the evidence at trial and 
viewed numerous photographs of the trailers and made findings 
based on that evidence. 
6. Wagner asserts that the Award/Contract which 
allows Hercules to use the Navy's property gives Hercules 
"wide-ranging use and control" of all the property provided under 
the contract. (Brief at 4, H 11). An examination of the "Gen-
eral Provisions for Facilities Use Contracts" of the 
3 
Award/Contract (R. 270-94), however, reveals just the opposite. 
2
 For example, Wagner claims "that several units are joined to 
form expansive office complexes." (Brief at 4, II 10). However, 
the trial court found that "each unit is entirely 
self-contained." (R. 626, K 12). Wagner claims that the office 
units rest on a "permanent foundation of cinder block." (Brief 
at 4, H 10). The trial court, however, found that the mobile 
office units rest upon cinder block stacks which are placed on 
wooden pallets which lay on a gravel foundation. (R. 625, H 11). 
3 For example, under the terms of the Award/Contract, none of 
the Navy's land may become "a fixture or loose its identity as 
personalty by reason of affixation to any realty." (R. 275, 
11 8). Absent prior Navy approval, Hercules can use the property 
only in performance of its prime contract with the Navy. (R. 
270, 1 2). Hercules is required to submit a schedule which 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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7. Wagner claims that Hercules failed to identify a 
valid reason to justify a Writ of Certiorari. (Brief at 5). 
However, Hercules expressly identified three valid reasons for 
this Court to issue its Writ: (1) the decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this case conflicts with a prior Supreme Court 
4 decision; (2) the Court of Appeals decided an important question 
of state law which has not been but should be settled by this 
5 
Court; and (3) the opinion of the Court of Appeals misapprehends 
the Payment Bond and Mechanic's Lien statutes. Any one of these 
reasons, alone, is a valid basis for this Court to issue a Writ 
of Certiorari. 
8. Wagner claims that the decision of the Court of 
Appeals does not conflict with the Mueller case, arguing that the 
test in Mueller for determining whether property is real or per-
sonal is "limited specifically to relatively small individual 
items rather than to entire buildings or structures." (Brief at 
10). Mueller makes no such limitation, but does adopt a 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
outlines its plan for maintenance of the property, and the Navy 
may order increases or decreases in that schedule at any time. 
(R. 273, f 6). The facilities on the Navy's property are subject 
to government inspection at all times and places. (R. 274, K 7). 
And finally, Hercules is not permitted to construct, alter or 
make any fixed improvements to the Navy's buildings or land with-
out the Navy's prior written approval. (R. 284, 1 29). 
4
 Namely, Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'nf 657 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1982). 
5
 Namely, whether the use of the Navy's land and the lease with 
Modulaire constitute an attachable real property interest under 
the Mechanic's Lien statute. 
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tripartite test for distinguishing between real and personal 
property• To argue, as Wagner does, that the mobile office units 
are realty because they are buildings, begs the question. The 
issue is whether the mobile office units are realty or person-
alty, and Mueller provides the test for making that 
determination. 
9. Wagner claims that use of the Mueller test would 
establish that the units became part of the realty. (Brief at 
7-8). To the contrary, the trial court applied the test and 
found: (1) the mobile office units were placed on the Navy's land 
temporarily and were not integrated into, affixed to, annexed to 
or adapted the Navy's land; (2) the Navy's land could be used for 
a variety of purposes; and (3) Hercules did not intend to place 
the units on the Navy's land permanently. (R. 627-28, 1U 21-23). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in its Petition, 
Hercules renews its request that this Court issue a Writ or Cer-
tiorari and reinstate the District Court's Order and Judgment. 
6
 The test consists of the following factors: (1) the manner 
in which the item is attached or annexed to the realty; 
(2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular use of the 
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make an item a 
permanent part of the realty. Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283. Given 
the first factor of the Mueller test, it is surprising that 
Wagner claims that the mobile office units should be regarded as 
part of the realty "regardless of the manner in which they are 
placed upon the land." (Wagner's Brief at 12). 
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DATED th is 22i .—day of February, 1991. 
M. <EfeB6ANTE ES 
MARK S. WEBBER 
DAVID M. BENNION 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Hercules, Inc. 
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